INTRODUCTION
"As, then, the physician ought to be called to account by physicians, so ought men in general to be called to account by their peers."
-Aristotle
It is beyond dispute that the "standard of care" (existence of, compliance with, and deviation from) is the evidentiary focus of the medical negligence trial.
2
A deviation from the standard of care, proximately causing injury, is a prerequisite to the imposition of medical negligence liability. 3 The standard of care is not a singular concept, or perhaps more specifically, is not singularly defined. Whichever definition is utilized from the standard of care spectrum (locality rule on one end of the spectrum, national standard of care on the other end), it is fundamental to the law of medical negligence that expert testimony is required to prove the existence of the standard of care, deviation from (or compliance with) the standard of care, and a deviation from the standard of care proximately causing the patient's injury. 12 The jury is simply not permitted to conclude that a physician was negligent in a fashion similar to that utilized in a garden-variety, non-professional negligence case. 13 Of course, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702) governs expert testimony in the federal district courts and provides as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 12. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 87. 13. See, e.g., ILL. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 11, § 105.01 ("You must not attempt to determine how a reasonably careful [physician] would act from any personal knowledge you may have.").
2019] NON-PHYSICIAN VS. PHYSICIAN 683
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 14 Most, but not all, states have adopted the standards encompassed by FRE 702. 15 It is significant to note that FRE 702 does not specifically qualify or disqualify any particular type of expert witness. Typically, the medical negligence plaintiff will produce a physician-expert witness to establish the standard of care applicable to the defendantphysician, deviation from the standard of care, and the resulting damages. 16 This traditional approach to the use of a physician-expert witness was well explained almost fifty years ago by Professor John Waltz:
The plaintiff in all but the most self-evident medical malpractice case is required to produce in support of his claim the testimony of qualified medical experts. This is true because the technical aspects of his claim will ordinarily be far beyond the competence of the lay jurors whose duty it is to assess the defendant [-] doctor's conduct. And the plaintiff himself, lacking the training and experience that would qualify him to characterize the defendant's conduct, is incompetent to supply guidance to the jurors. Of course, the qualified medical expert referred to by Professor Waltz is understood to be a physician. 18 As one commentator explained, "It takes one to know one." 19 The source of the applicable standard of care in a specific medical negligence claim is multifaceted. The testifying expert witness, when explaining the applicable standard of care, "would draw upon his own education and practical frame of reference as well as upon relevant medical thinking, as manifested by literature, educational resources and information available to practitioners, and experiences of similarly situated members of the profession." 20 Accordingly, in typical medical negligence litigation, the plaintiff's expert witness testifying regarding the existence of and the defendant-physician's deviation from the standard of care would be a physician.
Why, then, have courts permitted non-physicians to give standard of care testimony against physicians? Cross-disciplinary standard of care testimony against physicians has been provided by an array of non-physicians: a biomechanical engineer, 21 a pharmacist, 22 a nurse, 23 pharmacologists, 24 and a pharmacologist/toxicologist. 25 Is cross-disciplinary standard of care expert testimony an aberration? Does it reveal a failure of trial courts to understand the practice of medicine and knowledge of the standard of care? These topics are the primary focus of this paper. 18 . See Kelner, supra note 16, at 122-23 ("Thus, to prove a doctor's careless departure from prevailing standards of care usually requires that another doctor testify against the defending doctor. It takes one to know one.").
19. 
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To be fair, it should be noted that the reasoning of some courts to permit or exclude non-physician, cross-disciplinary expert testimony may be informed by state rules of evidence, rules defining expert witness requirements, or rules pertaining to lawsuit filing requirements. Those rules may be unclear and require interpretation. Therefore, rules such as these are not the focus of this paper. Instead, this paper focuses on how courts understand medicine, the standard of care, and the professional, experiential distinction between physicians and non-physicians. Ultimately, this paper recommends that trial courts should not permit non-physicians to opine that defendant-physicians have deviated from the applicable standard of care while recognizing that as more medical care is provided by nonphysicians, courts may decline this recommendation.
I. The Practice of Medicine
To address the propriety of cross-disciplinary expert testimony, some context is necessary. Physician-defendants in medical negligence litigation have allegedly violated the standard of care in their respective medical practices.
26
The practice of medicine has been defined or explained as follows:
 "According to philology, logic, and common sense, it is simply the art of healing . . . ."
27
 "The practice of medicine in its broadest sense includes the whole relationship of the physician with his patient."
28
 "The practice of medicine is a human endeavor." Therefore, the practice of medicine contemplates physician training, a physician-patient relationship, and patient care. As a necessary corollary, physician judgment is implicated. Non-physicians, even those who provide patient care, simply do not experience health care as physicians do. It is fair to question how a court might permit standard of care testimony against a physician by a non-physician. This paper now seeks to survey the landscape of non-physician experts and explore how courts have permitted and excluded their standard of care testimony against physicians.
II. The Biomechanical Engineer
In Trees v. Ordonez, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a biomechanical engineer properly testified that a neurosurgeon violated the standard of care in his placement of surgical hardware during the performance of "an anterior cervical decompression and fusion on [the] plaintiff."
32
In rather extensive detail, the court described the hardware utilized by the neurosurgeon and the process of its surgical placement. 33 Post-operatively, the plaintiff suffered "pain, difficulty swallowing, and the sensation of a plate in her throat." 34 Furthermore, she "had additional symptoms, including contamination of the surgical wound with oral bacteria and amylase, which indicated that the plaintiff's esophagus may have been perforated." The Supreme Court of Oregon held this expert testimony sufficient to implicate the standard of care for a neurosurgeon. 54 The concern here is not a biomechanical engineer's lack of knowledge of surgical devices. The concern is that the biomechanical engineer does not treat patients and does not experience the circumstances confronted by a neurosurgeon. 
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engineer is not required to exercise surgical judgment based upon the neurosurgeon's experience and training.
55
The biomechanical engineer, therefore, is not obligated to comply with the medical standard of care in the course of treating a patient. Accordingly, courts should not allow biomechanical engineering experts to opine on a physician's deviation from (or compliance with) the standard of care.
56

III. The Psychologist
Psychology has been defined as "the study of the mind and behavior . . . ."
57
. Psychologists treat patients with depression, anger, anxiousness, chronic conditions, stress, and addictions and "are also trained to administer and interpret a number of tests and assessments . . . that can help diagnose a condition or tell more about the way a person thinks, feels [,] The opposing view, however, "argues that one danger of allowing psychologists prescription privileges is that there is no way to ensure psychologists' understanding of potentially harmful interactions with patients' non-psychotropic prescription medications, constituting systemic malpractice." 68 Another argument in opposition to the prescription privilege is "that the nature of the practice of applied psychology would dramatically change, Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendantphysician "was negligent in treating . . . mental and emotional illness with the drug Thorazine." The Minnesota Supreme Court found a lack of the necessary foundation for these opinions, essentially due to the fact that the plaintiffs' psychology expert was not a physician. Even if the plaintiffs' expert in Lundgren had prescription privileges as a psychologist, he continued to lack the experience and training of a physician. Certainly, with prescription privileges to consider, it is only an assumption that the Minnesota Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion. That conclusionprohibiting the psychologist expert from testifying as to the deviation from the medical standard of care-was appropriate.
Not long after Lundgren, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a similar issue in Bell v. Hart. In Bell, the plaintiff's physician prescribed her "Elavil, a tricyclic anti-depressant," 82 following plaintiff's hospitalization. After alleged complications from the medication, the plaintiff filed a medical negligence claim, 
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urging the negligent prescription of Elavil.
83
One of the plaintiff's expert witnesses was a psychologist who had completed course work and "research related to the prescription, use, dosage, and administration of various drugs under different circumstances." 84 He had "taught college [-] level courses in psychopharmacology, which is related to the use, dosage, and administration of drugs and the effects of drugs upon individuals who have taken them under varying circumstances, including, but not limited to, psychiatric drugs that might affect the central nervous system." 85 He had consulted and taught regarding drugs such as Elavil. In his deposition, he "testified that [the defendant] deviated from the accepted standard of care in the medical community for the prescription, dosage, and administration of the drug Elavil to the plaintiff . . . ."
86
The trial court reviewed the deposition testimony of the psychologist and another expert and granted a motion in limine to exclude the testimony. 87 Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-physician.
88
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama referred to Lundgren, and followed the lead of the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In Bell, therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that "we cannot permit a non [-] physician, who cannot legally prescribe a drug, to testify concerning the standard of care that should be exercised in the prescription of the drug." 89 Although the Supreme Court of Alabama referred to the need for expert medical testimony, 90 it may have left open for discussion the question of whether a psychologist with a prescription privilege would be permitted to testify as to a physician's alleged deviation from the standard of care. The point here is that, notwithstanding a psychologist's prescription privilege, a psychologist is not a physician, does not have the experience or training of a physician, and should not be permitted to give standard of care opinions against a physician.
IV. The Dentist
The American Dental Association (ADA) has defined dentists as "doctors who specialize in oral health." 91 The ADA has identified the basic responsibilities of dentists as follows:
 Diagnosing oral diseases.  Promoting oral health and disease prevention.  Creating treatment plans to maintain or restore the oral health of their patients.  Interpreting x-rays and diagnostic tests.  Ensuring the safe administration of anesthetics.  Monitoring growth and development of the teeth and jaws.  Performing surgical procedures on the teeth, bone, and soft tissues of the oral cavity.
92
There are, however, dental specialties, and oral and maxillofacial surgery is one of them.
93
It "is a branch of dentistry that deals with the diagnosis and treatment of oral conditions requiring surgical intervention."
94
In the United States, maxillofacial surgery is performed by dentists with this specialty and by physicians. 95 Courts of review have examined efforts by plaintiffs to utilize dentists-maxillofacial surgeons as expert witnesses (or potential expert witnesses) against physicians. 
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permitted a dentist-maxillofacial surgeon to testify that a physiciansurgeon deviated from the standard of care applicable to an oralmaxillofacial surgeon who treated jaw fractures.
97
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that a dentist-maxillofacial surgeon was not permitted "to express an opinion about the standard of care that governs a family medicine doctor or a radiologist . . . ."
98
The specialty-trained dentist-expert opining on the standard of care applicable to a physician-surgeon is likely a product of a "turf war" between the professions. 99 Courts may begin to recognize dentists, particularly those with specialty training, as oral physicians.
100
These dentists would have training and experience coextensive with physicians and would be familiar with the applicable standard of care.
V. The Chiropractor
It has been urged "[a] that chiropractic's identity is as a provider of spine care." It is fair to suggest that chiropractic education and training do not approximate medical education.
It would seem intuitively obvious that a chiropractor should not be permitted to give standard of care testimony against a defendantphysician in a medical negligence case. This was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals of Indiana in Stackhouse v. Scanlon.
106
Here, the patient was hospitalized for leg pain, had a suspected pulmonary embolism, 107 was anticoagulated, and was "diagnosed with septic shock syndrome." 108 Apparently, during the course of a catheter placement to monitor blood flow, "a large vein was perforated." 109 The patient died shortly thereafter.
110
A complaint for medical negligence was filed. In an effort "to establish the requisite standard of care, or that it was breached," 111 the plaintiff produced an affidavit of a chiropractor. 112 The trial court found that the chiropractor was "not qualified to testify regarding the standard of care rendered in this case by board certified physicians specializing in internal medicine and pulmonary disease . 
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qualified to serve as experts in cases involving physicians. They do not have the same education, training [,] or experience, all of which are generally necessary to render an opinion of benefit to a jury."
114
Due to the absence of the required expert testimony, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
115
In 1971, a student-authored law review article stated: "Chiropractors have been held competent to testify as expert witnesses in malpractice suits against medical doctors." 116 The author referred to two state supreme court cases for this proposition.
117
These cases will be examined to determine if the author's pronouncement suggests that chiropractors may testify to the standard of care applicable to a medical doctor, and to deviation from the standard of care.
In Ness v. Yeomans, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed a jury verdict against a physician for the alleged improper "setting and treatment of a broken arm." 118 At trial, a chiropractor who treated the plaintiff testified as to x-rays of the plaintiff's arm, "some of which were taken by this witness." 119 He testified about his education, training, and experience with x-rays. 120 In approving this testimony, the court significantly noted:
A chiropractor may testify as to matters in which he is qualified to speak so long as he is not attempting to testify in regard to a school of treatment separate and distinct from his. therefor. He was not so testifying.
121
The chiropractic witness, therefore, was permitted to testify about taking and interpreting x-rays.
122
He did not provide standard of care testimony.
123
In fact, the plaintiff did not introduce any expert testimony at trial, "being content to depend upon the crossexamination of the expert witnesses furnished by the defendant[] and the examination of the [x]-ray pictures taken."
124
As the plaintiff failed to produce any standard of care or deviation from the standard of care testimony against the defendant-surgeon, the court reversed the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for a new trial and remanded the case for a new trial.
125
Another point should be addressed regarding Ness.
126
As a treating chiropractor, it may well have been appropriate to allow this witness to testify about x-rays, particularly those which he took and interpreted in his treatment of the plaintiff. It is, however, problematic if the jury is able to compare those x-rays and interpretations to radiological studies interpreted by radiologists (physicians) and draw inferences as to the quality of care rendered by physicians. Medical literature reveals that chiropractic radiology facilities and image quality do not compare favorably with those of physician-radiologists.
127
Chiropractors are not radiologists 128 and should not be permitted to provide standard of care testimony against a physician-radiologist (or other medically trained physician).
The other reported opinion referred to in the student law review article is Dorr, Gray Here, a newborn suffered a neurological injury.
140
At trial, the court prohibited plaintiffs' neuroscience expert, who had excellent academic, research, and teaching qualifications, from providing standard of care testimony.
141
On appeal, the court stated that because the neuroscience expert was "not a medical doctor[] and has never treated patients, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing him from answering questions concerning the standard of care."
142
The court did, however, note that "[n]on-physicians may qualify as medical experts by virtue of special experience" 143 and that the neuroscientist's "experience clearly qualified him to testify about brain function and the causes of damage to the brain." 144 Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by precluding this witness from testifying as to causation.
145
The Ponder opinion clearly detailed the qualifications and experience of the neuroscience expert. 
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in confirming that the expert could not provide standard of care testimony. He was, however, "clearly qualified . . . to testify about brain function and the causes of damage to the brain."
147 That testimony implicated causation, not the standard of care applicable to the defendant-physician.
VII. The Physiologist
"Physiology is the study of normal function within living creatures. It is a sub-section of biology, covering a range of topics that include organs, anatomy, cells, biological compounds, and how they all interact to make life possible."
148
"Physiology teaches that all biological phenomena are connected."
149
More than thirty-five years ago, the Washington Supreme Court considered cross-disciplinary expert testimony of a non-physician physiologist, including language in its opinion that predicted an expansive and flexible approach to the determination of expert-witness qualifications. The standard of care against which a health care provider's conduct is to be measured is that of a reasonably prudent 147 This supposed "trend" is debatable. It disregards the problem with non-physician experts discussed thus far in this article; they do not have the physician experience of caring for patients and decisionmaking in that context. This issue, however, cannot be ignored. Ultimately, this paper address non-physician healthcare providers who are intimately involved in patient care 156 and whether those nonphysicians should be entitled to opine on the medical standard of care.
VIII. The Pharmacist
It has been aptly noted that:
[o]ver the past four decades, the role of the pharmacist has 
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evolved from an individual who was primarily responsible for safely and accurately distributing a medication product to a patient[] to an individual who works side-by-side with physicians, nurses, and other healthcare professionals in sophisticated, highly specialized practice settings to assure appropriate medication therapy management.
157
In fact, "pharmacists' scope of practice includes the provision of direct patient care services in primary care settings."
158
The pharmacists involved in direct patient care receive specialty training and are known as clinical pharmacists.
159
Perhaps coincidental or perhaps related to a more recent recognition of the pharmacist as a health care professional, there is an interesting array of judicial decisions relating to standard of medical care testimony by pharmacist-experts. 160 The most interesting decision pronouncing the strict exclusion of a pharmacist's medical standard of care testimony is Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals. 161 Here, the Washington Supreme Court considered a medical negligence claim that alleged that the defendants negligently prescribed asthma medication 162 and negligently monitored blood medication levels. 163 The plaintiff intended to utilize a pharmacist as a standard of care expert against the defendantphysicians. 164 The state supreme court succinctly framed the issue as 157 Despite the fact that Young followed the same court's opinion in Harris six years later, which apparently created an opportunity for cross-disciplinary standard of care testimony, the Young court pronounced: "This court has never accepted, however, a rule that would allow a non [-] physician to testify as an expert regarding the proper standard of care for a physician practicing a medical specialty. Such a rule would severely degrade administration of justice in medical malpractice actions." 166 Additionally, the court stated that "we have found no cases in which a non [-] physician is found competent to testify on a physician's technical medical standard of care in a medical malpractice case." 167 Although the court was willing to acknowledge a pharmacist's training and expertise regarding medications, it highlighted that a pharmacist lacked the specific training and experience of a physician, stating, "With all due respect to the pharmaceutical profession, pharmacists are not doctors and are not licensed to prescribe medication because they lack the physician's rigorous training in diagnosis and treatment." 168 Essentially, then, the Young opinion reflects a valid strict belief that pharmacists are not physicians and, therefore, cannot opine on the standard of care applicable to a physician. 169 The Court of Appeals of Georgia reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. Harris; 170 however, the court's opinion was largely informed by a Georgia statute governing the opinions of expert witnesses in medical negligence litigation. 171 Here, the plaintiff's pharmacist expert testified that the defendant-physician "had violated the 165 Here, the plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action in connection with the defendant-physician's prescription of Elavil, an antidepressant.
180
The plaintiffs' pharmacist expert, a well-qualified clinical pharmacist, gave deposition testimony, opining that the defendant-physician "deviated from the accepted standard of care in the medical community for the prescription, dosage, and administration of the drug Elavil . . . ."
181
The trial court excluded this testimony based on lack of competency. The supreme court agreed that the pharmacist expert was not competent to opine "on the standard of care of physicians in prescribing the drug Elavil." 183 By stating that the standard of care in medicine "must be established by medical testimony," 184 the court concluded that medical testimony must be given by physicians. 185 Furthermore, the court stated that it could not "permit a non [-] physician, who cannot legally prescribe a drug, to testify concerning the standard of care that should be exercised in the prescription of the drug." but the state's highest court "reversed . . . because he had substantial experience studying and advising patients regarding oncology medications, including Amifostine, and therefore, should have been permitted to testify." 190 In Maryland, the doctrine of informed consent requires a physician to disclose material information that "a physician knows or ought to know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's 
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position in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treatment or procedure." This includes "the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success of the contemplated therapy and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate consequences associated with such treatment."
191
Of course, these disclosure requirements establish a standard of care applicable to the physician seeking a patient's informed consent.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland confirmed that expert testimony was required for proof in an informed consent claim 192 and stated that the plaintiff's pharmacist-expert "may have been qualified to testify about the likelihood and severity of risks caused by the administration of Amifostine." 193 The court stated that the pharmacy expert "was never offered as an expert to testify about the types of information [the defendant-physician] had a duty to disclose . . . ." This supposed distinction is troubling and may be a distinction without a difference. If the pharmacist-expert is permitted to testify about material risks of drug administration, the expert is, arguably, testifying to the medical standard of care, which requires disclosure of "material information" significant to a patient. Therefore, this evidence could contribute to a jury determination of a standard of care violation and contradict the Court of Appeals of Maryland's opinion that the pharmacist expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care.
196
The most liberal position on the propriety of a pharmacist's standard of care testimony against a defendant-physician has been taken by the United States District Court in South Dakota. the district court considered a defense motion in a medical negligence claim arising from the defendant-physician's treatment of plaintiff's hyperlipidemia (high cholesterol). 199 The plaintiff's sole disclosed expert was "a licensed pharmacist and clinical toxicologist" 200 who was expected to testify to the standard of care applicable to a physician regarding the use of medications for the treatment of high cholesterol, breach of that standard of care, and causation.
201
The defendant-physician moved for summary judgment due to the alleged lack of competent expert testimony as to the standard of care.
202
Unquestionably, the plaintiff's pharmacist expert was well qualified as a clinical pharmacist.
203
He had earned an undergraduate degree in pharmacy and a doctorate in clinical pharmacy.
204
He also had extensive subsequent training and teaching experience regarding medication safety, including the medications that the defendantphysician prescribed to the plaintiff, and had previously provided medical standard of care testimony in litigation. 205 The district court observed that "[t]he only professional license [he] holds is in pharmacy[;] he is not licensed to make a medical diagnosis and does not hold medical staff privileges at any hospital." 206 Additionally, the district court noted that plaintiff's pharmacist expert "[was] not permitted to prescribe medications for patients."
207
Of course these facts suggest that, despite the pharmacist's wealth of knowledge, he does not have the experience identical to a physician who can diagnose and treat patients with high cholesterol.
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The district court, in referring to South Dakota law, held that the plaintiff's pharmacy expert was a medical expert 208 and that he was "competent to testify as to a physician's standard of care in monitoring the safe and effective use of statin drugs." 209 Therefore, Romero represents an aggressive approach to cross-disciplinary expert testimony, implicating the issue of whether an expert's lack of physician training and the physician-patient experience should disqualify the non-physician expert from opining on the medical standard of care.
IX. The Nurse Anesthetist
A nurse anesthetist is a highly trained nurse who administers surgical anesthesia and, apparently, does so quite well. In Carolan v. Hill, the Iowa Supreme Court, referring to a state statute requiring "medical qualifications" of expert witnesses, 217 held that licensure was not a requirement for the admission of expert testimony 218 and a nurse anesthetist's testimony as to the medical standard of care applicable to a physician was improperly excluded by the trial court. The state supreme court stated that "having worked so frequently with surgeons, she was as knowledgeable as they about the way surgeons ordinarily supervise nurse anesthetists."
222
More than forty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court sent mixed signals regarding the propriety of medical standard of care testimony by a nurse anesthetist. 223 In Cornfeldt v. Tongen, the state supreme court considered a medical negligence claim involving surgical procedures for a perforated ulcer and removal of "suspicious cells." 224 Subsequently, the patient suffered liver damage and died from hepatitis.
225
A medical negligence action followed, stating claims against multiple defendants.
226
As to the defendant- 
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anesthesiologist, the plaintiff alleged that he "was negligent in his selection of Fluothane as one of the anesthetics."
227
At trial, the trial court determined that "the chief nurse anesthetist . . . lacked the qualifications to render . . . expert medical opinions . . . ." 228 Specifically, the opinions were "relative to the use of anesthesia" during surgery. 229 The trial court excluded the testimony because the nurse anesthetist "was not licensed to practice medicine in . . . [any] state." 230 The court disagreed with the trial court's basis for disqualifying the nurse anesthetist from testifying. The court held that:
Thus, [the nurse anesthetist] was not disqualified from testifying solely because he was not a licensed physician or because he did not graduate from medical school and had received only the training of a registered nurse anesthetist. If [he] otherwise had sufficient scientific and practical experience about the matter to which he would have testified, he would have been a competent expert witness. Therefore, the trial court erred in excluding [his] testimony on that basis. 231 Clearly, this pronouncement suggests that a nurse-anesthetist expert is able to testify about the use of an anesthetic at surgery, implicating the standard of care applicable to an anesthesiologist. The court's next statement is curious. It seems that the court has confused two concepts. First, a standard of care expert witness is always able to give opinion testimony, and the opinions given are those of the expert.
233
It is true, however, that the personal preference of an expert-how the expert would have treated the patient-is not standard of care testimony and may be excluded.
234
It is simply unclear if the court's opinion in Cornfeldt recognizes that a nurse anesthetist expert witness may testify that an anesthesiologist deviated from the applicable standard of care.
Despite the Cornfeldt uncertainty, courts may be persuaded to permit nurse anesthetists to testify as standard of care experts against anesthesiologists. If the roles of the nurse anesthetist and anesthesiologist are overlapping, and perhaps identical, a well-trained and experienced nurse anesthetist may be familiar with the medical standard of care, despite the lack of medical school training.
X. The Pharmacologist/Toxicologist
It has been stated that "pharmacology is the study of drug action," 235 and "the essence of pharmacology [is] trying to understand how to make drugs precisely effective and safe and also establish how they work." The American Chemical Society (ACS) defines toxicology as follows: "Toxicologists study the safety and biological effects of drugs, chemicals, agents, and other substances on living organisms. They develop methods to determine harmful effects, the dosages that cause those effects, and safe exposure limits." The trial court had excluded the testimony.
243
In Thompson, the plaintiff's pharmacology/toxicology expert had earned a master's degree in these disciplines and had significant practice and teaching experience. 244 He was familiar with the antibiotic at issue as well as the plaintiff's illness. 245 The court noted that the possession of a medical degree is not necessary for an expert to testify to the medical standard of care.
246
The key ingredient is medical knowledge.
247
The court did not note that the expert was not an urologist, did not treat patients with urological diseases, and did not have the clinical experience and context of a trained physician. A compelling dissent urged that the court confused the standard of care applicable to a physician with causation and that the plaintiff simply did not produce any standard of care evidence.
249
It is elementary that a properly prescribed and administered medication which causes complications will not support a verdict against a physician for medical negligence. The expert was a retired dean of a pharmacy college where he taught and "engaged in clinical research on aminoglycosides, the group of drugs to which Tobramycin belongs."
253
Without citation to authority, the court of appeals pronounced:
It seems clear, then, that to the extent physicians do rely on a body of pharmacological information, the expertise of a pharmacologist is virtually indistinguishable from that of the physician.
[Because] physicians rely upon information that originates with or is provided by the practitioners in another field, here pharmacologists, this reliance opens the door for these non [-] physicians to testify as to that body of information. In effect, where a physician "borrows" a standard of care from the research and work of other professionals, members of that profession may testify about it. 
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As in Thompson v. Carter, the court of appeals was, apparently, unconcerned that the pharmacology expert lacked patient-care experience. It did not provide an effective explanation for the ability of a pharmacologist to know how a reasonably well-qualified physician should act under the circumstances. 255 Similarly, in Pratt v. Stein, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff's expert pharmacologist, a professor of pharmacology, was qualified to opine on the medical standard of care applicable to the administration of neomycin, an antibiotic. 256 Here, the court stated:
The primary focus of his testimony was that neomycin was known to be a highly toxic antibiotic, that there were other, safer drugs that could have been used . . . , and that the dosage and manner in which neomycin was administered was below the standard of reasonable medical care. Since pharmacology is the study of various medications, their origin, nature, properties, and effects upon living organisms, . . . it would appear that [he] was eminently qualified to render an opinion on this subject. 257 Again, the court ignored the fact that the pharmacology expert was not a physician and lacked the experience of prescribing antibiotics while treating a patient. was disqualified from offering standard of care opinions against a defendant-physician. In so doing, the court appreciated that physicians and pharmacologists may have overlapping knowledge regarding "dosage issues and usage issues" 261 yet noted that although they are both medical professionals, "they are not in the same profession and do not receive the same training.
262
A New Jersey appellate court, in Cardinale v. Losman, held that a pharmacologist could not give standard of care opinions against a defendant-physician. 263 Here, the court found that the pharmacologist lacked the necessary qualification to opine on the medical standard of care and that the pharmacologist's lack of a medical license was not the basis of its decision. 264 The same pharmacologist was the subject of a similar decision of a New York state appellate court in Jordan v. Glens Falls Hospital. 265 The court noted that despite "an impressive curriculum vitae, he is not a medical doctor and hence his opinion as to the course of treatment [the] defendant should have undertaken was beyond his 'professional and educational experience and cannot be considered "competent medical opinion" on [ 
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of proof in medical negligence litigation 268 and by the pharmacologist's concession "that he did not consider himself qualified to testify to the standard of care of an ophthalmologist in the defendant's position."
269
The court also emphasized that the pharmacologist "did not have a medical degree and had received no training in the medical fields of ophthalmology or hematology." 270 Additionally, he had no relevant research experience, no experience treating patients with the disease at issue, and "had never encountered the disease prior to being retained as a consultant in this case."
271
The courts prohibiting medical standard of care testimony by pharmacology experts are on the correct side of the issue. Despite having in-depth knowledge of medications, pharmacologists lack the clinical training and experience gained by physicians.
272
XI. The Physician Assistant
Having developed in the 1960s, the physician assistant profession was "a new health care provider model to work only with physician supervision and not as independent providers." 273 The typical physician assistant curriculum is a full-time program, just over two years in duration. 274 There is a national certifying exam and a continuing medical education requirement. 275 As of 2011, it was estimated that there were more than 70,000 physicians assistants in the United States. In Bradford v. Alexander, the plaintiff alleged that "she suffered chemically induced hepatitis as a result of [the defendant's] negligent prescription of an antibiotic to which she was allergic." 278 The defendant moved for summary judgment, supported by his own affidavit stating that he complied with the applicable standard of care.
279
The plaintiff attempted to resist the defendant's motion with an affidavit of a physician assistant who claimed that she was familiar with the standard of care applicable to a physician, allegedly the same standard of care applicable to a "physician associate."
280
The trial court granted summary judgment was granted for the defendant-physician.
281
On appeal, the court referred to a Texas statute governing expert witness testimony in a medical negligence case and held that a physician assistant did "not practice medicine as contemplated by the statute . . . ."
282
The court also "found no authority in Texas to support the proposition that a physician assistant is qualified to testify about the standard of care a physician owes his or her patient." 283 Further, the court stated that "[i]t would indeed lead to incongruity if we permitted a subordinate to testify as an expert concerning the standard of care to which we hold his or her supervisor, who has greater knowledge and training than the subordinate." 284 The court's reference to the physician assistant as a "subordinate" is unfortunate and unnecessary. The physician assistant's education, training, and experience is not equivalent to that of a physician. is, therefore, reasonable that a physician assistant cannot opine on the standard of care applicable to a physician.
XII. The Advanced Practice Registered Nurse/Nurse Practitioner
The National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN) defines the advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) as follows:
Advanced practice registered nurses (APRN[s] ) are a vital part of the health system of the United States. They are registered nurses educated at Masters or post Masters level and in a specific role and patient population. APRNs are prepared by education and certification to assess, diagnose, and manage patient problems, order tests, and prescribe medications.
286
Certified nurse practitioners (CNPs) are a subset of APRNs and are defined by the NCSBN as follows:
CNPs are educated and practice at an advanced level to provide care, independently, in a range of setting [s] and in one of six described patient populations. CNPs are responsible and accountable for health promotion, disease prevention, health education and counseling as well as the diagnosis and management of acute and chronic diseases. They provide initial, ongoing [,] and comprehensive care to patients in family practice, pediatrics, internal medicine, geriatrics, and women's health. CNPs are prepared to practice as primary care CNPs or acute care CNPs, which have separate national competencies and unique certifications. It has been urged that a primary care physician shortage is responsible for the popularity of nurse practitioners. 289 Courts have not been inclined to allow nurse practitioner expert witnesses to opine on the medical standard of care. 290 In Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that plaintiff's nurse practitioner expert could not opine on the standard of care applicable to a physician providing "postoperative care following tracheal resection surgery," 291 because "[a]s the lower courts concluded, [she] has neither the training nor the practical experience necessary" 292 to do so. She was, however, qualified to opine on the nursing standard of care.
293
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in Tucker v. Talley, held that a "nurse practitioner cannot speak to an alleged missed case of cryptococcal meningitis 294 on the part of a physician." 295 The court utilized an "overlapping expertise test" 296 to assess the ability of the nurse practitioner to opine on the medical standard of care:
"The general rule is that a member of a school of practice other than that to which the defendant belongs is not competent to testify as an expert in a malpractice case." "The question presented here is whether there is sufficient proof of overlapping expertise to establish that [the] nurse . . . was competent to give the affidavit against . . . a medical doctor." . . . The ordering of medical tests is not shown to be an overlapping function between a nurse practitioner and a medical doctor inasmuch as a nurse does not have independent authority to order diagnostic tests.
297
The Utah Supreme Court, in Boice Ex Rel. v. Marble, considered a medical negligence claim against a physiatrist by a patient who "fractured his neck and herniated a cervical disc in a recreational accident."
298
The patient was surgically treated and transferred to a rehabilitation facility, where he fell from a wheelchair and suffered additional injuries.
299
The patient was re-hospitalized and then returned to the rehabilitation facility. 300 Subsequently, the patient underwent additional surgery, but various deficits remained.
301
The patient sued the defendant-physiatrist, "claiming that [he] caused or contributed to the loss of use of his left wrist, hand, and fingers."
302
The plaintiff designated expert witnesses, including a physiatrist who later withdrew, leaving the plaintiff with an APRN to testify as to the standard of care applicable to the defendantphysiatrist. 303 The APRN submitted an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff in an effort to resist the defendant-physiatrist's motion for summary judgment. 304 The trial court struck the affidavit. 
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qualifications of the non-physician expert to opine on the medical standard of care.
329
This "common knowledge" approach may appear attractive but is not without its shortcomings.
This paper urges that knowledge of the standard of care is, alone, insufficient to qualify a non-physician expert to opine on the medical standard of care. How that knowledge was acquired is crucial. The non-physician does not benefit from the context gained by the physician. 330 Typically, the non-physician expert has not acquired knowledge in the process of treating patients. 331 This lack of context should be the disqualifying factor.
This having been said, the solution of the issue is difficult and not at all clear. There may be a legitimate argument that non-physicians should be qualified to opine on the medical standard of care applicable to a physician. This is the case because as non-physician healthcare professionals-for example, nurse practitioners and nurse anesthetists-provide increased primary and other healthcare, perhaps as a result of a shortage of physicians in these practice areas, these non-physicians perform functions that overlap with or substitute for those performed by physicians. 332 For a court to determine that a non-physician expert actually knows the medical standard of care, the court must understand the medicine involved in the litigation, a topic about which courts are not particularly proficient. 333 This understanding derives only from an indepth study of the facts, the non-physician's actual credentials, and experience. This decision should not be made lightly. In most cases, likely the large majority of cases, courts should not permit nonphysician expert witnesses to opine on the medical standard of care.
